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Abstract
We link up with the recent literature on the differentiated MNC with its
stress on intra-MNC knowledge flows.  However, rather than focusing on
the characteristics of knowledge as determinants of knowledge transfer
within MNCs, we focus instead on levels of knowledge in subsidiaries,
the sources of transferable subsidiary knowledge, and on the
organizational means and conditions that realize knowledge transfer as
the relevant determinants.  We find largely positive support for the
relevant hypotheses which are tested on a unique dataset on knowledge
development in subsidiary firms (the Centre of Excellence-project).
Conference theme: Knowledge creation and transfer in inter-organizational
networks
1I. Introduction
It is now commonly accepted that knowledge ranks first in the hierarchy of
strategically relevant resources (e.g., Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Grant 1996), in
fact, it is so widely accepted “… as to have become almost axiomatic” (Gupta and
Govindarajan 2000: 473). More precisely, the issue of knowledge imitability is seen
as crucial to the understanding of competitive advantage and its sustainability
(Lippman and Rumelt 1982; Simonin 1999).  Accordingly, a cottage industry has
emerged on the various characteristics of knowledge that may hinder the
imitability of rent-yielding knowledge assets, such as causal ambiguity (Lippman
and Rumelt 1982; Mosakowski 1997), complexity, and tacitness (Winter 1987).
Much of this has taken place in the context of resource-based (Wernerfelt 1984;
Barney 1991), knowledge-based (Grant 1996), and evolutionary theories of the
firm (Nelson and Winter 1982; Foss, Knudsen and Montgomery 1995).  The
conceptually different, yet closely related, issue of how knowledge is created and
renewed has been treated in, for example, the organizational learning (Cohen and
Sproull 1996) and the innovation management literatures.
However, the issues of the knowledge-based determinants of competitive
advantage and the creation and renewal of knowledge have not yet been
integrated.  Moreover, the literatures on the connection between knowledge and
competitive advantage have paid rather little attention to the organizational
aspects of the connection.  For example, little attention has been paid to which
organizational mechanisms that may decrease “internal stickiness” (Szulanski
1996) and help diffusing valuable knowledge inside the firms (Nonaka and
Takeuchi 1995), while still keeping knowledge inimitable to would-be imitating
rivals.
A parallel interest in knowledge as a strategic resource has characterized
much research in international business, perhaps particularly during the last
decade and a half (Bartlett and Choshal 1986; Gupta and Govindarajan 1991;
Kogut and Zander 1993).1   Some of this research has drawn upon the above type
of research into those dimensions of knowledge assets that hinder imitability (e.g.,
Kogut and Zander 1993; Simonin 1999). For example, in the context of
international strategic alliances, a literature has been taken up with examining
how characteristics of knowledge as well as characteristics of “knowledge
                                                
1 One may rightly point out that knowledge has been at the center of attention in the theory of the
MNC since Hymer’s early work.  However, the focus on knowledge has traditionally been a
(static) matter of explaining the existence of the MNC by focusing on failures in markets for
knowledge rather than on (dynamically) stressing the MNCs distinct capabilities of realizing
competitive advantages through managing knowledge flows.
2transmitters” and “knowledge receivers” influence the ease and speed of
knowledge transfer (e.g., Hamel 1991; Simonin 1999).2
A concern with knowledge as a source of competitive advantage and on the
renewal of competitive advantage through building new knowledge has also
characterized the literature on the differentiated multinational corporation
(Bartlett and Ghoshal 1986, 1989; Birkinshaw 1996). A well-known argument
posits that the differentiated MNC is in fact more favorably positioned than the
non-differentiated MNC or the purely domestic firm with respect to mobilizing
knowledge in the creation and renewal of competitive advantage, ceteris paribus,
simply because of its access to more knowledge networks (Hedlund 1986; Bartlett
and Ghoshal 1989). In different terms, the differentiated MNC can strike an
exploitation/exploration trade-off (March 1991) that may not be available to, for
example, purely domestic firms.
In such a perspective, the organizational design problem is to choose
organizational instruments of control, motivation and context in such a way that
1) subsidiaries actually access and produce knowledge, for example, through
tapping into local knowledge bases, 2) communication is established between
those who need and those who possess knowledge, and 3) the relevant subsidiary
knowledge is actually made available to those MNC units that need it.
Among other things, this has led to a renewed conceptualization,
understanding and appreciation of subsidiaries which are now seen as potential
sources of MNC-wide strengths (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1986, 1989; Birkinshaw
1996; Forsgren, Pedersen and Foss 1999), and perhaps even as “centers of
excellence” (Moore and Birkinshaw 1998; Holm and Pedersen 2000a).  In fact,
recent research has emphasized the need for direct lateral mechanisms between
individual subsidiaries (thus avoiding MNC headquarters acting as information
brokers) (Moore and Birkinshaw 1998).
However, much of the empirical (if perhaps not the theoretical) research on
the differentiated MNC tends to focus on characteristics of knowledge and
characteristics of senders and receivers rather than on organizational means of
transferring knowledge.   Moreover, much of this literature is silent on the sources
of transferable subsidiary knowledge (but see Porter and Sölvell 1999; Forsgren,
Pedersen and Foss 1999), for example, whether transferable subsidiary knowledge
is largely internally produced or acquired through interacting with firms in
networks or acquired through interaction with local knowledge institutions, etc.
However, not only may the sources of subsidiary knowledge strongly condition
the characteristics of knowledge; it may also be of more direct managerial
relevance.  Thus, while it may not be directly helpful for a manager to be told that
                                                
2 However, even as late as in 1994 Crossan and Inkpen (1994: 271) could point out that “… while
much of the MNC research has dealt with static theories of the firm and investigations of structural
questions, very little research has delved into the process of knowledge transfer and the barriers to
successful intraorganizational learning.”
3competitive advantage is best sustained if the rent-yielding knowledge asset
conforms to certain criteria (like tacit, ambiguous etc.), it may be very helpful to be
told that certain sources of knowledge are more likely to be associated with these
criteria than other sources.  This is because it may be difficult to change the
characteristics of knowledge by managerial action, but managerial action may
change the mode of knowledge acquisition.
In the present paper, we link up with the recent literature on the
differentiated MNC.   However, rather than focusing on the characteristics of
knowledge that hinder or stimulate knowledge transfer within the MNC, we focus
instead on the sources of potentially transferable subsidiary knowledge.   We
distinguish between knowledge sourced from internal development of knowledge
in the subsidiary, knowledge sourced from network relations and knowledge
sourced from local clusters.  We argue that these sources condition the
characteristics of knowledge in specific ways.  Therefore, they require different
organizational means and conditions of transfer.  For example, the extent of
interdependence among the MNC-units, the amount of intra-MNC trade and the
autonomy of the subsidiary are all conditions that we argue influence in different
ways the expected success of transferring knowledge from different sources.
In sum, our contributions in this paper are, first, to examine how well
knowledge acquired by subsidiaries and stemming from diverse sources is
transferred within an MNC.  Second, we also examine the organizational means
and conditions, specific to individual MNCs, that condition the success of
transferring knowledge, arguing in effect that knowledge stemming from
different sources requires different organizational means and conditions for
successful transfer.   Both of these two contributions are, to our knowledge, novel
to the literature.  Moreover, the hypotheses related to how the sources of
knowledge and organizational context influence knowledge transfer are tested on
the basis of a unique and very rich dataset on subsidiary knowledge development
that has been constructed in connection with a cross-national project Centres of
Excellence (Holm and Pedersen 2000a). The dataset is covering more than 2.000
subsidiaries located in seven different European countries.
II. Theoretical Model
Although it is widely accepted in the literature that the MNC owes its existence to
its superior ability (relative to markets) to transfer knowledge and that this
superior ability may at the same time be a source of competitive advantage
(relative to purely domestic firms), it is also widely recognized that the resource
costs of knowledge transfer are likely to be substantial.  Thus, Teece (1981)
estimated that transfer costs for the intra-MNC technology transfer cases he
examined ranged from 2, 24 percent to 59 percent with a mean of 19,16 percent.  In
the view of Kogut and Zander (1993: 630) “… these costs are derived from the
efforts to codify and teaching complex knowledge to recipient.”
4Along similar lines, Szulanski (1996) showed that his findings imply that the
barriers to knowledge transfer were only to a very small extent motivational (at
least in the sense of, for example, agency theory).  Rather, the barriers to
knowledge transfer had to do with causal ambiguity, the receiver’s absorptive
capacity and the general atmosphere in the relation between sender and receiver.
However, his findings did not relate to the context of cross-border knowledge
transfer.  In fact, rather little is known about the determinants of intra-MNC
knowledge flows in spite of their obvious importance to theoretical arguments
about the MNC. Thus, Gupta and Govindarajan (2000: 474) observe that with
some notable exceptions (e.g., Zander and Kogut 1995), “… very little systematic
empirical investigation in the determinants of intra-MNC knowledge transfers has
so far been attempted.”
In this section, we develop the theoretical arguments that intra-MNC
knowledge transfer is influenced by the intensity of knowledge production and
knowledge absorption of subsidiaries, the sources of knowledge, and the
organizational instruments and conditions that surround the transfer of
knowledge within an MNC.  These determinants are discussed seriatim in the
following.
Intensity of Subsidiary Knowledge Production and Absorption
As a trivial matter, for knowledge transfers from a subsidiary to the MNC
headquarters or to other subsidiaries to take place, transferable knowledge has to
exist.   As we later present in more detail, we focus on three main sources of such
transferable knowledge, namely internal development, networks, and local
clusters.  Less trivially, a basic organizational problem is to motivate the
subsidiary to actually transfer knowledge that may be useful to other subsidiaries.
One set of problems is who should bear the resource costs of transferring
knowledge and how the parties to the knowledge exchange are to be
compensated.  We shall abstract from this problem, and assume that it can be
handled by the subsidiaries and the headquarters through structuring
compensations in the right way.   A rather different motivational problem is that
to the extent that a subsidiary possesses a knowledge monopoly it controls a lever
of bargaining power in the MNC, since it controls a crucial complementary asset
(Hart 1995).  Transferring knowledge is tantamount to giving up this power
(Holm and Pedersen 2000b).  Gupta and Govindarajan (2000: 475) briefly point to
such a problem.
However, whether this is a serious problem depends not only on whether
MNC headquarters can somehow force or motivate subsidiaries to transfer
knowledge to other subsidiaries or to headquarters, it also depends on the time
frame.  Thus, the knowledge monopoly problem is likely to be much more serious
in a static context than in a dynamic one.  In a dynamic setting, generalized
knowledge exchange (á la von Hippel 1988) may catch on in a network of
subsidiaries, so that subsidiaries are motivated to transfer knowledge to each
other through the discipline of repeated dealings (Klein and Leffler 1981).  In fact,
5in a dynamic context one may gain power by transferring knowledge.  This is
because influence is likely to flow to a subsidiary that is able to continuously
transfer knowledge to other subsidiaries.3  In contrast, the argument that
knowledge transfer diminishes power implicitly assumes that once knowledge is
transferred, the subsidiary is on par with everybody else in the MNC in terms of
knowledge held and therefore cannot exercise any power based on the control of
knowledge assets.
In this paper, we deal with subsidiaries that are involved in lengthy relations
with headquarters and other subsidiaries and, hence, engage in repeated
interaction with these. Thus, we believe it is justified to assume that in fact
subsidiaries will be motivated to transfer knowledge.  The ability of headquarters
to influence the transfer of knowledge through control and incentive mechanisms
only reinforces this.  In other words, to the extent that subsidiaries control
knowledge that may be useful to other units in the MNC, they will in fact make an
attempt to transfer this knowledge.  Therefore, we state the following set of
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The more knowledge that the subsidiary creates and absorbs, the
more knowledge will be transferred to other units in the MNC.
Hypothesis 1a: The more knowledge that the subsidiary creates through
investing in internal production of knowledge, the more knowledge will be
transferred to other units in the MNC.
Hypothesis 1b: The more knowledge that the subsidiary creates and absorbs
through network relations to external partners (customers, suppliers, etc.),
the more knowledge will be transferred to other units in the MNC.
Hypothesis 1c: The more knowledge that the subsidiary creates and absorbs
by tapping into the knowledge-base of a local cluster (e.g., a well educated
work force, high quality research institutions, etc.), the more knowledge will
be transferred to other units in the MNC.
Two things should be noted in connection with these hypotheses.  First, transfer of
knowledge does not imply a “full” replication of knowledge in a new location.
Indeed, transfer of knowledge is often associated with modification of the existing
knowledge to the specific context. Therefore, what is transferred is not the
underlying knowledge, but rather applications of this knowledge in the form of
solutions to specific problems. Second, note that the hypotheses are cautiously
stated so a qualitative change leads to another, sign-preserving qualitative change.
(So, for example, a 5000 percent increase in subsidiary knowledge leading to a 0.1
percent increase in knowledge transfer is consistent with the hypothesis). This is
because of the many non-motivational barriers to the process of transferring
knowledge.   We treat this in the following.
                                                
3 Thus, the power-wielding asset is the dynamic capability to produce and transfer new
knowledge.  For further discussion of the determinants of subsidiary power in an MNC network,
see, for example, Forsgren, Pedersen and Foss (1999: 184).
6Sources of Subsidiary Knowledge and Barriers to Knowledge Transfer
The basic premise for work on the differentiated MNC is that subsidiaries
control heterogeneous stocks of knowledge and that competitive advantages can
be achieved from orchestrating knowledge flows between MNC units in such a
way that knowledge is transferred to those MNC units where it will increase
value-added.   In this connection, much has been made out of the directionality of
knowledge flows (e.g., Gupta and Govindarajan 1991), the centrality of certain
subsidiaries (Birkinshaw 1996) and patterns of corporate control (Egelhoff 1988).
Arguably, less attention has been devoted to the determinants of intra-MNC
knowledge transfer, although work has been done on motivational and cognitive
barriers to knowledge transfer (Zander and Kogut 1995; Gupta and Govindarajan
2000).   In the previous section, we briefly discussed motivational barriers to
transfer.  Non-motivational barriers to transfer have normally been
conceptualized in terms of such factors as causal ambiguity, complexity, tacitness,
absorptive capacity, and the like.  Although they make perfect theoretical sense,
these variables may be hard to operationalize.4  A more operational approach may
be to examine how the sources of subsidiary knowledge influence intra-MNC
knowledge transfer.
Although an internal element necessarily enters into the production of all
subsidiary knowledge, it makes sense to distinguish between
1) knowledge that is produced mainly through investing in the internal
production of knowledge (e.g., much R&D) or from learning by doing, using,
etc.;
2) knowledge that is to a large extent created on the basis of knowledge inputs
from network relations to external partners (customers, suppliers, etc.), and
3) knowledge that is to a large extent created on the basis of knowledge inputs
from a local cluster (e.g., a well educated work force, high quality research
institutions, etc.).
The first category of knowledge is the kind of internal knowledge that has
been highlighted in resource- and knowledge-based theories of the firm (Foss
1997).  In this literature, the focus has been on production and organization
knowledge that is embodied in bundles of routines of a highly tacit and social
nature.  Teams of individuals operate it for some strategic purpose.  Because of
their characteristics, such knowledge is strongly intertwined with the organization
itself and are therefore hard (very costly) to trade in the market.   This leads us
directly to the conventional argument for the existence of the MNC, which asserts
that MNCs exist because of their comparative advantages (vis-a-vis markets) of
transferring knowledge.   Though arguably correct, that argument fails, however,
to distinguish between the transfer of knowledge that differs in terms of their
                                                
4  Although a few successful attempts do exist (Kogut and Zander 1993; Simonin 1999; Gupta and
Govindarajan 2000).
7sources.5  We argue that the ease of transfer of knowledge is likely to be
influenced by the sources of the knowledge.
Of course, no knowledge is entirely internally accumulated (Nohria and
Eccles 1992; Foss and Eriksen 1995; Kogut 2000).  For example, parts of the
knowledge base of a subsidiary firm are likely to be the result of previous
knowledge transfer from other MNC units.6 Nevertheless, it makes sense to say
that some knowledge is largely internally produced, while some other knowledge
is strongly based on external knowledge inputs. We distinguish among two
external sources of knowledge that may be available to subsidiary firms.  The first
category may be called “network-based knowledge.”  We here have in mind the
gaining of knowledge from long-lasting interaction with specific external parties,
notably customers or suppliers, and the use of that knowledge in the firm’s
activities (Ford 1990).  For example, Dyer and Nobeoka (2000) examine Toyota’s
production network, and argue that Toyota’s ability to create, manage and take
advantage of network-based knowledge flows is a strong explanation for the
many productivity advantages enjoyed by Toyota (as well as its suppliers).
In contrast to network-based knowledge, “cluster-based knowledge” is not
to the same extent the result of long-lasting interaction with specific parties.
Rather, cluster-based knowledge refers to knowledge controlled by the subsidiary
that to a substantial extent is based upon knowledge inputs from, for example, a
well educated work force or local knowledge institutions, such as technical
universities, etc. (Porter 1990; Porter and Sölvell 1999). Other examples of cluster-
based knowledge could be knowledge developed on the basis of interaction with
regulatory authorities, knowledge of local tastes, etc.
Our distinction between three types of sources of knowledge that enter into
the subsidiary knowledge base is different from the conventional distinction
between, for example, production, marketing or R&D knowledge; the latter types
of knowledge may all in principle have internal, network and cluster components.
The advantage of our distinction is that it may be more plausibly discussed in
terms of general characteristics of knowledge than the activity-based definitions of
knowledge.  For example, it is hard to argue on apriori grounds that, for example,
production knowledge is inherently more complex, ambiguous or tacit, and
therefore harder to transfer, than marketing knowledge.  In contrast, we consider
it more justified to make this kind of arguments with respect to our distinction,
although with considerable cautiousness.
Sidestepping motivational issues (which have been dealt with earlier), the
success of knowledge transfer is primarily a matter of the existence and richness
of transmission channels (Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Ghoshal, Korine and
                                                
5 Of course, the literature has introduced distinctions between, for example, R&D capabilities and
marketing capabilities. However, this doesn’t go to the heart of the matter of the issue of the
sources of knowledge.
6 We shall, however, treat such knowledge inputs as internal (to the MNC network) in nature.
8Szulanski 1994), the characteristics of the transferred knowledge in terms of such
dimensions as tacitness, ambiguity, etc. (Zander and Kogut 1995; Szulanski 1996),
and the absorptive capacity of the target unit(s) (Gupta and Govindarajan 2000).
Thus, of the three knowledge sources that enter into the subsidiary
knowledge base, we submit that internally accumulated knowledge is likely to be
the type of knowledge which is most easily transferable and of which most will be
transferred.  This is because such knowledge to a large extent is based on
knowledge that has already been transferred to the subsidiary from other MNC
units.  Moreover, one reason why some subsidiaries control a knowledge-base
that is characterized by many internally accumulated elements may have to do
with a strategic decision at the MNC level concerning the localization of processes
of knowledge-creation.  Thus, there is likely to be considerable understanding of
the knowledge developed internally in the subsidiary at least at a headquarters
level. In sum, internally accumulated knowledge may be relatively easily
transmitted through existing transmission channels, and although it may contain,
for example, tacit elements, the absorptive capacity of target units is likely to be
relatively high.
Network-based knowledge is likely to be less easily transferable than
internally accumulated knowledge.  This is because this type of knowledge is to a
large extent derived from specific problems and needs of external counterparts
with which the subsidiary interacts. Much of this is likely to be tacit in nature.
Therefore, it contains many elements that are hard to transfer to other MNC units.
Still, because network-based knowledge relates to the subsidiary’s products or
processes, much of it will still be easily transferable, at least to those other MNC
units that have similar products or processes.  Finally, cluster-based knowledge
will be the kind of knowledge that will be least transferred.  This may be
somewhat contra-intuitive, since it may be argued that some cluster-based
knowledge may be less characterized by tacit elements than, say, internally
accumulated knowledge.  For example, knowledge inputs from local universities
may have a high explicit knowledge content.  However, knowledge inputs from
local universities may constitute a rather small part of cluster knowledge, given
that the tendency in most MNCs is to source this kind of inputs in centrally placed
R&D departments and not in local subsidiaries (Gassman and von Zedtwidtz
1999).  Therefore, much of the content of cluster-based knowledge is likely consist
of knowledge of local skill levels, tastes, regulatory authorities, etc., much of
which may be hard to transfer or of no or little use for other MNC units. The
underlying argument here is that the more context-specific the knowledge, the
less knowledge will be transferred, both because it is of lesser use and because the
context specificity may affect the absorptive capacity in other MNC units. Thus, to
sum up, we put forward the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: More internally accumulated knowledge will be transferred from
subsidiaries to other MNC units than network-based knowledge which in turn will
be more transferred than cluster-based knowledge.
9Organizational Means and Conditions of Knowledge Transfer
Because knowledge built from different sources (internal, cluster, network) is
associated with different ease of transfer, the process of knowledge transfer is
likely to be supported by different organizational means and conditions. By
“organizational means and conditions,” we refer to such issues as the degree and
type of interdependence between MNC units and the management of that
interdependence through formal systems and informal processes (Bartlett and
Ghoshal 1989; Gupta and Govindarajan 1991, 1995; Buckley and Carter 1999).  A
key theme in many recent contributions to the theory of the MNC is that  under
norms of administrative rationality  the degree and type (unilateral, bilateral;
economies of scope, economies of scale) of interdependence strongly condition the
choice of types of management systems and processes for managing subsidiary
relations (ibid.).  For example, Gupta and Govindarajan (1995) hypothesize that
interdependencies in terms of inflows of knowledge to, and outflows of
knowledge from, a focal subsidiary condition the choice of administrative systems
and processes, such as formal integrative mechanisms, communication linkages,
and intra-corporate socialization.
We agree with the basic thrust of this literature. However, the type and
degree of interdependence is not the only determinant of the choice of
administrative and managerial systems and processes. We argue that the concern
with this link be supplemented with attention to how the sources of subsidiary
knowledge conditions the choice of such systems and processes.
For example, subsidiary knowledge with a large component of network-
based knowledge may require different administrative mechanism for its
successful transfer than subsidiary knowledge with a large component of
internally accumulated knowledge.  Because the former type of knowledge is,
according to our reasoning earlier in this paper, less easy to transmit through
established MNC communication channels exchange of knowledge (such as
regular, formal meetings among the relevant people or intranets with databases of
the knowledge pool) than the latter type of knowledge. Transfer of network-based
knowledge may require non-routine communication, such as the temporary
transfer of people from the transferring to the receiving MNC unit (e.g., cross-unit
teams and job-rotation), for its successful transfer.
In general, network-based subsidiary knowledge is likely to require close
and rich communication between the transferring and the receiving MNC
unit/subsidiary.  Further, such communication is likely to be stimulated by the
transfer of goods and/or services between MNC units.  First, the transfer of goods
and/or services, that is, intra-MNC trade, is in itself a force pulling in the
direction of a widening of the bandwidth of communication channels.  Second,
network-based knowledge is per definition derived from needs and problems of
counterparts.  To the extent that such knowledge is embodied in products and
services which are then transferred to other MNC units, it is likely to give rise to
communication about possible modifications in goods and/or services, so that
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these may better be adapted to the needs of the receiving MNC unit.  We may
therefore put forward the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Network-based knowledge will be more successfully transferred to
other MNC units if there is substantial transfer of goods and/or services between the
transferring and the receiving units.
We argued earlier that when the knowledge-bases of some subsidiaries show
a high proportion of knowledge that is mainly accumulated internally, this may
reflect MNC-level strategic choices, in the sense that headquarters establish a
pattern of specialization in the accumulation in certain types of knowledge within
the MNC.  Such MNC-wide specialization evidently implies a high degree of
interdependence.  Thus, we hypothesize that
Hypothesis 4: Knowledge that is mainly accumulated internally will be more
successfully transferred to other MNC units if there is a high degree of
interdependence between the transferring unit and the receiving units.
Finally, we argue that a very important aspect of the management of subsidiaries
in the MNC network is the autonomy granted to the subsidiary. In other words,
which decision rights are delegated from MNC headquarters and top-
management to the subsidiary?   If subsidiary knowledge is mainly based on
external knowledge (i.e., network and cluster-based) it is hard for MNC
headquarters and top-management to direct the subsidiary’s acquisition of such
knowledge because of the knowledge asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling 1992).  In
that case, it may be better to delegate decision rights to the subsidiary  (Aghion
and Tirole 1997), that is, increase its autonomy.  We have earlier argued that to the
extent that a subsidiary is engaged in knowledge-trading with other subsidiaries,
this counteracts the control-loss that accompanies giving a subsidiary increased
autonomy.   Thus, giving a subsidiary more autonomy allows it to better tap into
networks and local clusters, and also means that more knowledge will be more
successfully transferred to other MNC units.  Hence, we have the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Knowledge that is strongly based on participation in networks and
local clusters will be more successfully transferred to other MNC units if the
transferring unit has been given a high degree of autonomy.
The hypotheses are summarized in the following model.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
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III. Data and Method
Data Collection
The data has been collected as part of the Centres of Excellence-project that
engaged researchers in the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, Germany,
Austria, Italy, Portugal and Canada. The CoE-project was launched in May 1996
with the purpose of investigating headquarter-subsidiary relationships and the
internal flow of knowledge in MNCs. A leading priority was to get proper data
for the project, and in order to collect quantitative data on acquisition of
subsidiary knowledge it was decided to construct a questionnaire that could be
applied in all the involved countries. After several project meetings and extensive
reliability tests of the questionnaire on both academics and business managers,
this was accomplished.7
For practical reasons, it was decided that each project member should be
responsible for gathering data on foreign-owned subsidiaries within their own
country. Thus, all subsidiaries in the database belong to MNCs. In the data
gathering, subsidiary managers, rather than headquarters, have been respondents.
One advantage of choosing subsidiary respondents is that they are directly
engaged in the market and therefore are more acquainted with its characteristics.
Although we can expect that the subsidiary have a reliable awareness of its own
competencies, it would be an advantage to gather information on intra-MNC
knowledge flows from other corporate units as well. However, it would be an
unmanageable task first to identify the subsidiaries in each country and then to
identify the relevant management units in the foreign MNCs.
The paper is based on empirical data from seven countries: Austria,
Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK. All countries are
located in the northern part of Europe, and the four Nordic countries are
considered to be relatively small, while Germany and the UK are among the
largest in Europe. Approximately 80 per cent of the questionnaires were answered
by subsidiary executive officers, while financial managers, marketing managers or
controllers in the subsidiary answered the remaining 20 per cent. The response
rate varies between 20 (UK) and 55 per cent (Sweden), depending on the country
of investigation. The quality of the data is quite high with a general level of
missing values of not more than 5 per cent.
 XXXXXXXX INSERT TABLE 1 HERE XXXXXXXX
As shown in table 1, the total sample covers information on 2.107
subsidiaries. It comprises all kinds of subsidiaries in all fields of business. Between
countries, the sample ranges from 202 (UK) to 530 (Sweden). With the exception of
Sweden, the size of the sample is rather similar in the other six countries. The
                                                
7 For more information on the CoE-project, see Holm and Pedersen (2000a).
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average number of employees in the subsidiaries is 742 and the median is 102.
Within the five smaller countries, the average size of the subsidiaries are very
similar, while Germany and UK  due to their larger market sizes  comprise
substantially larger subsidiaries. As we expect larger subsidiaries to comprise
more knowledge and therefore more potential for knowledge transfer we need to
control for this bias in the data material when conducting our tests of the
hypotheses.
For all these subsidiaries are covered information on the level of subsidiary
competencies, the sources of this competence, and to what extent the knowledge
has been transferred to other MNC-units. The subsidiaries were asked to indicate
the level of competence for six different activities performed by the subsidiary on
a seven-point Likert scale, from 1=very weak competence to 7=very strong
competence. The six activities are research (basic and applied), development (of
products and processes), production (of goods and services), marketing and sales,
logistics and distribution and purchasing. The average score on the seven-point
scale of the level of competence is shown in table 2.
 XXXXXXXX INSERT TABLE 2 HERE XXXXXXXX
In general, the subsidiaries are indicating that they comprises a relatively high
level of competence for all activities with average values ranging from 4 to 6 in the
upper level of the seven-point scale. The pattern is very similar for all the six
countries with the highest competence levels for production and marketing/sales
and somewhat lower levels for the four other activities. As expected, the larger
German and UK subsidiaries have higher competence levels than the other
subsidiaries in the sample. They have slightly higher values than the total sample
for all six activities.
Measures
All data were collected through the questionnaire and most items were
measured using seven-point Likert scales. However, items such as the number of
employees were measured using actual values. The following sections provide the
exact wording used for questionnaire items.
Knowledge transfer. Recall that our definition of knowledge transfer was
capturing the application rather than the physical transfer of the subsidiary
knowledge in other MNC units. Accordingly, in the questionnaire the subsidiaries
have been asked to what extent the subsidiary knowledge has been of use to other
MNC units. Respondents have indicated this on a seven-point Likert scale, where
1 was defined as “to no use at all for other units” and 7 was defined as “very
useful for other units” for all the six above-mentioned activities. Knowledge transfer
is a multi-item construct calculated as the average score reported by respondents
across these six items (Alpha=0.69).
Internal knowledge. The construct of internal knowledge is capturing the
subsidiaries own effort of knowledge production. This construct was measured by
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asking respondents to assess the level of investments in the subsidiary in the past
three years, where 1=very limited, 7=substantial. The level of investments was
assessed for all the six above-mentioned activities. In the models used to test our
hypotheses we use a composite measure, Internal knowledge, based on the average
across all six items (Alpha=0.70).
Network knowledge. The variable of network knowledge is capturing the
importance of external counterparts like customers and suppliers as sources of
knowledge creation in the subsidiary. It was measured by asking respondents to
assess the impact of various external organizations on the development of the
subsidiary's competencies, where 1=no impact at all, 7=very decisive impact. Four
organizations were identified: external market customers, external market
suppliers, specific distributor and specific external R&D unit. Our measure,
Network knowledge, is average of the individual scores (Alpha=0.62).
Cluster knowledge. Building on the elements of Porter's (1990) diamond
model, respondents were asked to assess the business environment in which they
compete along the following dimensions: Availability of business professionals;
availability of supply material; quality of suppliers; level of competition;
government support; favorable legal environment; and existence of research
institutions (1=very low, 7=very high). In the diamond model, the items are
presented as different dimensions, however, Porter's (1990) own emphasis on the
holistic nature of the model and the high inter-correlation between many of the
items motivated us to construct a composite index. Cluster knowledge is calculated
as the average score reported by respondents across these seven items
(Alpha=0.66).
Interdependence. This variable measures the extent to which the MNC units
are dependent on the subsidiaries and vice versa. The MNC dependence on the
subsidiary knowledge were assessed by asking the respondents the following
question: “What would be the consequences for other units in the Foreign
Company if they no longer had access to the competencies of the subsidiary?”
(1=no consequences, 7=very significant consequences). In a similar vein, the
subsidiary dependence on knowledge from other MNC units was captured by the
following question: “What would be the consequences for the subsidiary if it no
longer had access to the competencies of other MNC units?”  (1=no consequences,
7=very significant consequences). Taken together these two items reflects the
interdependence between the focal subsidiary and other MNC units.
Intra-MNC trade. The level of intra-MNC trade is an indicator of the breadth
of the internal trade links. It is measured as a single item, as the share of
subsidiary sale going to other MNC units in 1996. The subsidiary sale to other
MNC units includes both semi-products and final goods and services.
Autonomy. Based on the scale developed by Roth and Morrison (1992),
respondents were asked to identify the level at which certain decisions were
made, where 1=foreign corporate (HQ), 2=sub-corporate (e.g. division),
3=subsidiary level. Decisions were as follows: Hiring top subsidiary management;
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entering new markets within the country; entering foreign markets; changes to
subsidiary organization; introduction of new products/services; approval of
quarterly plan/schedules. Our measure, Autonomy, is based on the average of
these six items (Alpha=0.61).
Controls. To control for structural characteristics of the subsidiary that might
also influence the extent of knowledge transfer, we controlled for the following
factors: Number of subsidiary employees in 1996 (a proxy for size), the age of the
subsidiary (a proxy for accumulated experience), and its mode of formation
(greenfield or acquisition). We expect that larger, more established (i.e., older)
subsidiaries will be more likely to transfer knowledge to other MNC units,
consistent with our theoretical arguments of a cumulative process of knowledge
development in foreign subsidiaries. We have no predictions on the role of entry
mode for the extent of knowledge transfer.
IV. Results
Tests of Hypotheses
Since all variables in the model are measured as continuous variables, we
can apply standard regression techniques. However, since hypothesis 2 is about
the relative strengths of the three different sources of subsidiary knowledge and
the variables is not measured on the same scale, we have standardized all
variables in the model with mean=0 and standard deviation=1.  This makes it
possible to use the parameters in the model to compare the relative strengths of
the variables.
Appendix 1 presents a correlation matrix of all the independent variables in
the model in order to detect potential multi-collinearity problems. As can be seen
in the table, many of the correlations are highly significant; however, this is hardly
surprising given the substantial number of observations. The highest correlation
coefficient is between age and formation with the value of 0.37, which is well
below the threshold of 0.5. Therefore, we do not expect any multi-collinearity
problems.
It is straightforward to test Hypotheses 1a-1c, while hypotheses 3-5 are
tested by including the interaction term between the knowledge source and the
organizational mechanism. The result of the total model is reported in Table 3.
Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors.
XXXXXXXX  INSERT TABLE 3 HERE XXXXXXXX
Overall, the model works very well with a highly significant F-value of 89.8
and an R-square of 41.9.  This indicates that almost half of the observed variation
in the extent of knowledge transfer is explained by the variables in the model.  We
turn now to the tests of our explanatory hypotheses.
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Hypotheses 1a-1c posited a relationship between sources of subsidiary
knowledge and the transfer of that knowledge to other MNC units. Those
hypotheses are strongly supported. All three knowledge sources (internal,
network and cluster knowledge) have a significantly positive relationship with the
extent of knowledge transfer (all at the 1 per cent level).  However, the parameter
for internal knowledge (0.375) is substantially higher than for the two external
knowledge sources (0.178 and 0.083) indicating that internal knowledge is
transferred to a much larger extent transfer than network and cluster knowledge.
The parameter for network knowledge is somewhat higher than for cluster
knowledge. All in all, hypothesis 2 is supported which points to the conclusion
that not all knowledge is transferred to the same extent, and the sources of
knowledge seems to be a good indicator for the extent to which knowledge is
actually transferred. We argue that this is because the sources of knowledge is
determining the characteristics of knowledge, and in this case of internal MNC
knowledge transfer the context specificity of the knowledge turn out to be of
major importance.
Hypotheses 3-5 was concerned with the organizational mechanism as
facilitators of the knowledge transfer for the different sources of knowledge. In
hypothesis 3, we posited that intra MNC trade would interact positively with
network knowledge in the process of knowledge transfer. However, the
interaction term between network knowledge and intra MNC trade do not meet
the requirements for significance, although with a value of 0.12 it is close to reach
the acceptable level. Therefore, hypothesis 3 is not supported.
In the same vein, we posited that interdependence would interact positively
with internal knowledge (Hypothesis 4). This hypothesis is strongly supported by
the highly significant (at 1 per cent level) and positive interaction term.
Hypothesis 5 on the positive interaction between cluster and network knowledge,
respectively, and autonomy is supported with regard to cluster knowledge (at 5 %
level), but not for network knowledge.
The three organizational mechanisms  interdependence, intra MNC-trade
and autonomy  are also significantly and positively affecting the knowledge
transfer, in itself.
Moreover, all three control variables  the size, age and the formation of the
subsidiary  turn out to be highly significant indicating that larger experienced
subsidiaries and acquisitions rather than greenfields do transfer more knowledge
to other MNC units.
V. Concluding Comments
In this paper, we have addressed the issue of intra-MNC knowledge transfer in a
novel way. Whereas most of the literature has focused directly on either the
characteristics of knowledge in terms of causal ambiguity, tacitness, etc. or the
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links between interdependencies and administrative systems and processes, we
have taken a perhaps more direct approach and focused on the levels of
subsidiary knowledge, the sources of this knowledge and organizational means
and conditions as important determinants of knowledge transfer.
We found largely support for the main argument of the paper that the
sources of knowledge is determining the characteristics of the knowledge, and
that knowledge with different characteristics needs different organizational
mechanism to facilitate the transfer of that knowledge. The source of knowledge
 whether internal, network or cluster-based has a profound impact on the
characteristics of knowledge; in turns, this affects the extent of knowledge
transfer. Especially, the context specificity of the knowledge has an effect on the
extent of knowledge transfer both because the more context specific the
knowledge the lesser absorptive capacity and the lesser it can be used in other
MNC units.
Moreover, given the different characteristics of the knowledge it cannot be
transferred in the same way. Thus, even in the case of MNCs internal knowledge
transfer is not an easy task. MNCs needs to apply different organizational
mechanism to facilitate the knowledge transfer depending on the specific
characteristics of the knowledge. For a differentiated MNC engaged in global
knowledge sourcing the task is to develop a large spectrum of different
organizational mechanism. In some instances, like with subsidiaries tapping into
local cluster knowledge, the autonomy of the subsidiary seems to be important for
the knowledge transfer, while interdependence between the subsidiary and the
other MNC units are very important for the knowledge transfer in the case of
internal production of subsidiary knowledge.
However, there are various problems with our approach that need to be
briefly commented upon.  First of all, the measures that proxy organizational
means and context (Interdependence, Intra-MNC Trade, Autonomy) admittedly
do so only rather imperfectly, and we would have preferred to have much more
direct measures.   For example, it is somewhat unclear what kind of organizational
means or context the measure, Intra-MNC Trade exactly represents.  However,
these are unavoidable limitations of the dataset.  Another limitation that is also
dictated by the nature of dataset concerns the role of motivation factors.
However, we may invoke the Szulanski (1996) findings that motivational factors
were of relatively minor importance for understanding the efficiency of
knowledge transfer as a partial justification for neglecting motivational issues.
However, future empirical work must more closely inquire into the multitude of
organizational mechanisms, and how these structure knowledge flows.
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Table 1 Sample size and subsidiary employees in the different countries
COUNTRY SAMPLE SIZE SUBSIDIARY EMPLOYEES (mean)
Austria 313 318
Denmark 308 284
Finland 238 200
Germany 254 1.574
Norway 262 130
Sweden 530 244
UK 202 3.787
Total 2.107 742
21
Table 2 The average score on a seven-point scale of the level of competence.
COUNTRY Research Development Production Marketing
/sales
Logistics/
distribution
Purchasing
Austria 3.1 4.4 5.8 6.1 5.7 5.2
Denmark 4.8 5.2 6.0 5.9 5.7 5.3
Finland 4.3 4.9 5.9 5.9 5.5 5.3
Germany 4.6 5.3 6.3 6.2 5.9 5.7
Norway 4.2 4.9 5.6 5.7 5.3 5.2
Sweden 4.7 5.3 5.9 5.9 5.5 5.2
UK 4.9 5.3 6.1 6.1 5.9 5.5
Total 4.4 5.1 6.0 6.0 5.6 5.3
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Table 3 Factors affecting the extent of knowledge transfer to other MNC units
Constant  0.039**
(0.020)
Internal knowledge  0.375***
(0.021)
Network knowledge  0.178***
(0.020)
Cluster knowledge  0.083***
(0.020)
Interdependence  0.166***
(0.021)
Intra-MNC trade  0.146***
(0.020)
Autonomy  0.056***
(0.020)
Internal knowledge * Interdependence  0.065***
(0.019)
Network knowledge * Intra MNC trade  0.029
(0.019)
Network knowledge * Autonomy -0.014
(0.019)
Cluster knowledge * Autonomy  0.044**
(0.020)
Number of employees  0.795***
(0.159)
Age of the subsidiary  0.039*
(0.021)
Formation (1=Greenfield, 2=Acquisition)  0.086***
(0.022)
F-value  89.76***
R-square    41.9
N   1.629
***, ** and * = significantly at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively.
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Appendix Correlation matrix of the independent variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1) Internal knowledge 1.00
2) Network knowledge 0.31*** 1.00
3) Cluster knowledge 0.19*** 0.21*** 1.00
4) Interdependence 0.12*** 0.20*** 0.13*** 1.00
5) Intra MNC trade 0.18*** 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.30*** 1.00
6) Autonomy 0.12*** 0.01 -0.03 -0.20*** -0.06** 1.00
7) Employees 0.03 0.001 0.003 0.02 0.08*** -0.02 1.00
8) Age 0.003 0.01 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.05** -0.06** 0.001 1.00
9) Formation 0.17*** 0.08*** 0.03 -0.15*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.03 -0.37***
All the variables have mean=0 and standard deviation=1
 ***, ** and * = significantly at the 1, 5 and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively.
Figure 1 The hypothesized model
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